The First Month of the Ukrainian Offensive

July 2, 2023

It has been nearly a month since ZSU’s offensive began, and it’s time for an update, especially since so many things have happened in Ukraine, Russia, and elsewhere. If one were to read Western and Russian media, one would think that ZSU’s offensive is “slower than expected,” that it’s either “disappointing” or it has outright “failed” and that there is “stalemate” (so, naturally, calls for ceasefire abound). Nothing can be further from the truth. As we shall see, ZSU’s offensive is going as well — or better — than reasonable estimates expected it to, and July promises to be a hot month for the Russians. We will also discuss Prigozhin’s mutiny — although here I would have to be a lot more speculative and uncertain than I normally like to. It’s so murky though, that only some tentative assessment can be offered.

Situational Update

During the first week or so after the offensive began (roughly, on June 4), ZSU seems to have attempted a Blitzkrieg to repeat the Kharkiv operation — it attacked in multiple directions at once, hoping for a quick breakthrough that would turn the flanks of defending Russian units, causing others to become fearful of encirclement and force them to withdraw or run, thereby causing the collapse of an entire sector of the front. They attacked with small mobile forces but failed to achieve anything like Balakleya. It was worth trying, of course, since one never knows how much of a Potemkin village some Russian defenses will turn out to be, but the chances were not great, as I explained here. When ZSU realized that the hoped-for quick collapse is not happening, they paused (this coincided with some rains), regrouped, and began a methodical assault of the Russian defensive lines in several sectors in the South, as well as two in the East. The Russians concentrated on parrying the offensive in the south and east, while simultaneously launching attacks in the north in an attempt to divert resources there.

Let’s go through the different sectors counter-clockwise.

Left-bank Kherson. After blowing up the Kakhovka Dam, the Russians moved their forces away from the Dnipro, and withdrew the most seasoned troops to use in Zaporizhzhia. Their defenses here are now mostly manned by mobiki and are considered relatively weak. The desperate move must have been caused by the widespread expectation that ZSU would cross the Dnipro here but that the main thrust is likely to come in Zaporizhzhia. Since VSRF did not have great reserves there, they attempted to slow down the Ukrainians in Kherson to give themselves breathing space and more resources for the more dangerous direction. This seems to have worked as ZSU has encountered very determined resistance in Zaporizhzhia, as we shall see in a bit. The problem for the Russians, however, is that the time they bought with the flooding is at its end. Most of the water has receded and now there are places upstream from Novaya Kakhovka that ZSU could literally cross on land. Yes, it’s muddy but then that’s what the Western equipment is for. The crossing cannot be done without securing the other side and suppressing Russian artillery, of course, so we will see preparations for it in advance.

ZSU are also harassing the Russians just south of the city of Kherson. About two weeks ago, they landed a small group at the base of the Antonovskyi Bridge. Using the bridge as cover, they managed to not merely establish a foothold but enlarge it into what started to look like a bridgehead at Oleshky. At first, only Russian channels reported this, so people tended to dismiss it, but over time it became obvious that the fighting there is real, and serious. The Russians launched kamikaze drones, a fire ship (!!!), and attacked repeatedly, with no success. Eventually, they hit the bridge with an Iskander ballistic missile, which collapsed the east lane. However, the west lane remained intact and continued to provide shelter. As of today, the fighting there continues and the Russians have not been able to eliminate the bridgehead. While this looks like a relatively minor tactical setback for them — and many analysts tend to dismiss the operation as diversionary — one must bear in mind that a tactical diversionary operation can only succeed in diverting attention and resources if there is an implied strategic problem that failure to contain it would create. In this case, the problem would be ZSU establishing a real bridgehead on dry land at Oleshky, and then organize a crossing there. With the left bank being under fire control from the higher right bank, this could become a serious threat to VSRF, which would have to withdraw toward Crimea to continue defending. Allowing ZSU to amass enough resources for a push here would certainly cerate serious problems for the weakened Russian defenses. No wonder the Russians are trying so hard to eliminate the temporary foothold. I would expect them to try more missiles since they obviously cannot achieve it by other means.

The Landing at Oleshky

Zaporizhzhia. There are two active directions on this front, as shown — very roughly! — below: from West to East, the “Melitopol” and “Berdyansk” ones, as we can tentatively call them. The Russians must defend both because a breakthrough in any one of them would allow ZSU to separate the VSRF forces in the south, isolating the ones the remain to the west of where that break is achieved. These would then have to be supplied entirely from Crimea, which will probably make their position untenable, and they would have to withdraw to the peninsula.

From the area around Orikhiv, ZSU is advancing toward Melitopol. ZSU liberated the village of Piatykhatky and is trying to break the Russian defense, which is anchored in Vasylivka. This sector is among the best fortified, and correspondingly the fighting is very heavy. Having lost Piatykhatky, VSRF launched numerous counter-attacks trying to recover it, but they have all been unsuccessful. ZSU is also advancing toward Robotyne, which is part of the first line of the Russian defenses. According to some accounts, it has already breached them but this awaits confirmation.

Zaporizhzhia (South) Front

From Velyka Novosilka, ZSU are advancing south toward Berdyansk, and have recently liberated Rivnopil. Heavy fighting is reported at Staromaiorske and Urozhaine, and there are some indications ZSU units might have bypassed these and thrust toward Staromlynivka.

The Russians had a lot of time to build their fortifications here, but it’s important to note that the intense fighting is happening before these are reached. The defense lines are deeply echeloned, with additional fortifications around key settlements. The Russians are relying on mines and aviation to degrade ZSU’s capabilities and weaken any subsequent attack on the actual fortified areas. There are several reasons for this “advance” defense strategy.

First, it relies on remote mining — no sooner than ZSU have cleared some area of mines, the Russians can mine it again using their remote mining system Zemledelie. This requires no risk to themselves and slows down the Ukrainians quite a lot as they have to pause again and again to deal with the new obstacle (often after suffering some equipment losses from the mines themselves), which then gives the Russians the opportunity to attack them with aviation and artillery guided by drones. There have been significant losses from this but, and this is very important, we also see a lot of evidence for the superiority of Western IFVs and MBTs. Bradleys and Leopards have all been blown up by mines, attacked by “Lancet” loitering munition, and hit by artillery (in at least one Leopard case, all three!) but while disabled, they remain relatively intact, preserving both the crew and soldiers (in case of IFVs), and allowing for later recovery. (One video from yesterday showed the ZSU recovering vehicles that were earlier shown as destroyed by the Russians.) ZSU does not have a magic solution for going through minefields anymore than the Russians did — they have to go carefully and painstakingly through or around them. This takes time, especially since ZSU is not interested in just lurching forward regardless of cost as the Russians had been wont to do.

Second, aviation. This is where the lack of Western aircraft is most telling as F-16s could be useful against attack helicopters, at the very least. The Russians are suffering losses here though, and this resources is both limited and not easily reconstituted.

Third, less need to rely on infantry attacks. Morale in the Russian forces is quite low, especially where various mobiki are involved, and there is a lot of grumbling at chaotic and incompetent command. Forward defense with mines and aviation means that VSRF does not have to rely on poorly motivated troops to hold the line. It is, however, no panacea — as soon as ZSU get through an important village, the Russians often launch counter-attacks to recover lost territory. Seeing as these involve a lot of said troops, they very often go nowhere, further worsening morale. In a recent video (one of many), VSRF soldiers from the “Storm” unit explained how they were just recently withdrawn from the frontline in Zaporizhzhia, and complained that they had no food or water while there, that nobody was collecting the bodies (there were about 20 of them left out of 150), how they had been ordered into senseless attacks, how they had not been paid for 3 months, concluding that they had been wasted for no reason. Now they were refusing to return to the front, and they said an FSB colonel threatened any refuseniks with serious consequences. They went so far as to say that they were sending the video to all their relatives so that they would know that if the Defense Ministry told them the survivors had died at the front, it would not be true — they would have been killed by their own side. An intercepted call between soldiers and an officer reveals similar issues: attacks without purpose or support ordered by people who don’t even both to show up at the front. In that case, the officer had called to inform the troops that one of their local commanders (who had been with them) had died a hero’s death by calling a Russian artillery strike on himself in order to kill the advancing ZSU troops and give his own men time to retreat. To this, the soldiers just asked, “why was it necessary to be there in the first place?” And then the conversation quickly went downhill. The level of disrespect the soldiers showed to that officers is reminiscent of what happened to Americans during the Vietnam War.

While the Russian fortifications are formidable, their insistence on forward defense at almost any cost indicates that they do not place much faith in their ability to hold them given the state of their troops and logistics. Incidentally, the logistics are becoming very difficult as well since ZSU is putting the UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles to very good use. (Imagine what they would do with ATACMS that we have been refusing to give them.) Among the targets hit were bases in Henichensk and Berdyansk, the Chongar Bridge, as well as the depot and railway station at Rykove. In the hit of the HQ of the 35th Army, ZSU eliminated more than two dozen staff officers, including Major-General Goryachev, the Chief of Staff of that army. (There is a fascinating piece on the critical role of hitting command centers as part of Ukraine’s strategy.) The Russians have fortified transport hubs like Tokmak and Melitopol, but if ZSU get through their defenses, which are mostly concentrated in the north of the occupied territory, the interior is open. Getting Dzhankoy — the critical hub in Crimea — within range would be really helpful to ZSU. The number of Russian equipment, especially artillery, destroyed over the past month is also impressive, and has hit record levels. Here are the reported numbers for artillery:

It is important to emphasize that ZSU is also using artillery in enormous quantities, which means that it needs many more shells than it has. One source — about which I wrote half a year ago — are the millions of 155mm cluster munitions stored by the USA. These should have been sent a long time ago but the Biden administration has demurred. Why, I am not sure. The Russians have been using them since the start of the war, and Ukraine has gotten some of them from other supporters. If I understand it correctly, there are now some attempts to open up this resources to ZSU, and the sooner it happens, the better.

Bakhmut Sector

Bakhmut. The story of this town just would not end. After the Russians captured 99% of it and declared it theirs, PMC Wagner handed over the positions to VSRF and withdrew. Almost immediately, ZSU began to press to the north and south of the city using its existing forces there. It looked like an opportunistic move and, frankly, it still looks that way because neither ZSU nor VSRF have committed more forces to this sector, contend to contest it with the resources they have on site. In this, ZSU has had the upper hand. They have pushed the Russians east on both sides of the city, and have reportedly reentered its western suburbs. The situation in the direction of Klishchiivka seems particularly dangerous for the Russians. Still, I am not sure that this sector could yield some big strategic gains, but we shall continue to monitor it. I am sure ZSU will not allow themselves to be drawn into some meatgrinder like the Russians did, contrary to war criminal Girkin’s assertions that they are doing just that because they are desperate to show the West results before the NATO summit. The symbolic taking of a strategic dead-end might be important to the Kremlin but will not sway Ukraine’s supporters in any way. If the Kremlin is really determined to hold onto Bakhmut — which they might if they ever intend to continue the conquest of Donbas — then they might start throwing reserves there, which would mean weakening other sectors.

The Russians keep trying, unsuccessfully, to improve their positions around Avdiivka and at Mar’inka in Donetsk oblast. (Amuzingly, a Komsomolskaya Pravda milblogger proudly announced his interview with a stormtrooper from Donetsk, “who had been storming the Mar’inka ‘fortress’ for many years.” Storming a Donetsk suburb for many years… it’s almost as if the Ukrainian propaganda bureau wrote this.)

Northern (Luhansk) Front. The Russians keep launching offensive in several sectors here, the two main ones being from Kreminna in direction of Lyman, and from Svatove in the direction of Kupyansk. So far, VSRF have managed only a small advance in the former area along the left bank of Severskyi Donets river. This is widely considered a diversionary strike although the Russians have fairly significant foces in the area. ZSU have been repelling their attacks only with units already committed to the defense here. In other words, as of today, the diversion has not diverted anything.

Northern (Luhansk) Sector

To summarize, after convincing themselves that a Kharkiv-like Blitzkrieg was not in the cards, ZSU are essentially doing a repeat of the Kherson strategy, which is to press the Russians (albeit eschewing frontal assaults) while degrading their logistics to the point that they would either have to withdraw to risk a total collapse. This strategy is slow, but as we have seen in Kherson, once it “works,” the consequences come through relatively quickly. Given that ZSU have not committed more than 25% of their offensive resources (and neither have they used more than 10% of their Western-supplied equipment), their advance in the South is very good and very promising. Meanwhile, VSRF has dug into its operational reserves and has been moving troops around to plug various holes in this sector, amid mounting losses.

I am, therefore, at a loss to explain commentary that proclaims that the ZSU offensive has stalled or failed. Nobody with a modicum of understanding about what is going on would assess it that way. General Zaluzhnyi gave an interview to the Washington Post recently where he could barely conceal his irritation with this sort of nonsense. It’s often the same “experts” who argue that the West should not give Ukraine the tools to fight the offensive that now proclaim that it has failed. If people wanted it to go faster, we should have sent them F-16s, cluster munitions, and ATACMS a long time ago. We have essentially forced ZSU to fight a war that NATO would never fight: a mix between our combined arms warfare and Soviet-style offensive. Without air superiority, the advance is brutal, bloody, and costly. It just cannot be otherwise unless the Russians just break and run. Even with our CAA, recall that we bombed Iraqi forces for over a month during Desert Storm before launching the ground offensive in 1991, and in 2003 we invaded Iraq with 160,000 troops and the “shock and awe” aerial campaign, but this had been preceded by well over a year of systematic aerial attacks by both US and UK on Iraqi military structures. I am not sure why people seem to expect the Ukrainians to do things even the US would not do.

The Wagner Opera: The Final Act?

The last act of the Wagner Opera recounted here ended with me saying that “provoking MOD & others actually works out to Prigozhin’s advantage… as long as it does not lead to them trying to kill him.” Well, they tried to kill him. But before we get to these events, a brief update on what happened in the interim.

On June 11, MOD’s official response to Prigozhin’s vitriolic rants came in the form of an order by Shoigu that all “volunteer formations” had to sign contracts with MOD by July 1. This was a move they really had to make even before launching the war, frankly, as having multiple chains of command in Ukraine did not do the Russians any favors. Beyond trying to organize the many (up to 200 by some counts!) mercenary and volunteer units (technically, all units not part of VSRF are volunteers since mercenaries are forbidden under Russian law), this order sought to subordinate Wagner — at least its units operating in Ukraine — to MOD. Prigozhin refused by saying that Wagnerites would not sign contracts with Shoigu because given the latter’s incompetence, doing so would destroy the PMC’s military worth. FSB, through its mouthpiece Girkin, called Prigozhin’s refusal a “mutiny in the military.” The gauntlet was thrown and the challenge — accepted.

Within a day, volunteer units began to submit to MOD’s order. The most high-profile case was Kadyrov’s Akhmat, which did so with a — what else — a video. Interestingly, the terms of the contract stipulated that the Chechens would be deployed in Belgorod oblast to guard the border rather than being sent to Ukraine. While Kadyrov had come a long way since the early days when he criticized Shoigu, it seems that he had worked out a decent deal to preserve his men. Adam Delimkhanov, Kadyrov’s henchman and deputy in the Duma, soon arrived with the Chechen unit in Belgorod, where he said they are ready to fight Satanists and LGBTQ.

Meanwhile, Putin appeared in a video with Shoigu at some event, where he clearly seemed to be giving his Defense Minister the cold shoulder. This fueled the speculation that the boss was unhappy with MOD leadership, and could perhaps side with Prigozhin in the end. Predictably, Prigozhin escalated by declaring that Wagner would take in any volunteers who refuse to sign contracts with MOD, effectively threatening to set up an alternative military structure.

On June 13, Putin held a widely publicized meeting with various Russian milbloggers, leaving people with more questions than answers. He regaled listeners with some tales about how he had been duped by the Ukrainians in March 2022 who had pretended to have agreed to give up territories in exchange for which he had abandoned the attack on Kyiv. After they allegedly reneged, Putin said he had no choice but to conquer “practically all of Novorossiya and the larger part of Donetsk with the exit to Azov Sea and Mariupol, and practically all — with minor exceptions — of Luhansk.”

Girkin had an apoplexy, and for a good reason. You see, Novorossiya includes ALL of Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa. All of it. Putin’s geography here made no sense since he seemed to be referring parts of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson (sans regional capitals, which the Ukrainians hold), and totally excludes Mykolaiv and Odesa. Moreover ZSU currently control more than 60% of Donetsk oblast as well. Girkin wanted Putin to take a look at an encyclopedia definition of Novorossiya and reminded him that Putin himself started using the term in 2014. But Girkin was well aware that Putin knew exactly what Novorossiya meant, and he smelled a rat. He thought Putin was redefining the meaning on the fly in order to pretend that the special military operation had achieved the stated goals, as a prelude to some negotiated peace with Kyiv (an anatema to the imperialists). More to the point, Girkin implied that Putin simply did not know what was happening on the front, and that he had a much rosier picture than the grim reality for VSRF. During the closed sessions with the milbloggers — who apparently tried to tell Putin what had been happening in Ukraine — the boss had sounded surprised, and promised to look into it.

With respect to the Wagner’s feud with MOD, when asked whether volunteers should sign the contracts, Putin said that it would be necessary to do so in order to give the volunteers access to government benefits comparable to those of veterans. This left a lot of wiggle room to explain why some could refuse to sign without defying Putin. Not only did Putin fail to phrase this as an order, he further muddied the waters by mentioning some other considerations that he “couldn’t get into at that time” but that would require changing the laws (which could be a reference to giving them access to benefits anyway or legalizing PMC’s status). At any rate, this was not an unequivocal statement that many took it for at the time. Prigozhin, of course, had always insisted that he would fulfill any order by Putin, and he had been careful to limit his challenge to the Shoigu/Gerasimov leadership.

On the 14th, Kadyrov published a cryptic message asking Ukrainian intelligence for info about the location of their strikes because he could not contact his “dear brother” Delimkhanov. Earlier, news had broken that ZSU had struck troops concentrations, with one of them being a gathering of soldiers to listen to their commander’s speech before moving out. They were kept waiting for over an hour and ZSU located them. More than 200 could’ve died in the resulting HIMARS hit. The speculation was that Delimkhanov had been there or perhaps en route to the other places in the south. Speculation immediately arose that Wagner might have alerted the Ukrainians about his whereabouts — it was fueled by Venevytin, the commander of the 72nd Brigade, that the Wagnerites had forced to record the infamous video that he later repudiated. One of the main Chechen commanders, Allaudinov posted in his TG channel that he’s taking all Akhmat units out of Mar’inka and going to the “place where the incident with Delimkhanov” took place. There’s then a weird row of emojis consisting of various means of transportation, followed by the explanation that Kadyrov has ordered them to find and rescue Delimkhanov at all costs. Soon after that, Kadyrov posted a video that purportedly showed Delimkhanov safe and sound back in Chechnya, but it was soon determined that the video was old as it featured a map with Izyum still in Russian hands. Thus far, the fate and whereabouts of Delimkhanov are unknown, with the most credible rumor being that he had been seriously injured and is recovering somewhere safe. If there was any truth to the rumor about Wagner’s involvement in this, Kadyrov would not forget it.

As this was going on, Prigozhin doubled down on his refusal to sign contracts with MOD: “When we started participating in this war, no one said that we were obliged to enter into contracts with the Ministry of Defense. None of the fighters of the Wagner PMC is ready to go back to the path of shame. And that is why no one will enter into contracts.” Confusingly, he released another video where he stated that Wagner would return to the frontlines on August 5. How that would be possible if he defied MOD — the supplier of his ammunition and aircraft that Wagner pilots flew — was very unclear. This is why I thought Prigozhin was still trying to get Putin’s attention (there had been reports that Shoigu had successfully cut off his access to the Kremlin) and disagreed with analysts who took this as an open defiance of Putin’s statement to the milbloggers. On June 20th, Prigozhin said he was waiting for the Defense Ministry to respond to his own proposed “contract” that he had submitted to them. He did not publish the text of this contract so it was impossible to judge whether this constituted an attempt to disguise his capitulation to Shoigu or an escalation (e.g., with demands that Wagner only work with specific officers at MOD, all of whom would be from the putative anti-Shoigu group).

On June 21, Prigozhin went on another rant. Among the claims he made were that ZSU control Piatykhatky, Urozhaine, and the northern part of Robotyne, and were already in Sadove (only the first was true at the time), that command was chaotic and there was no ammunition (despite the problems I described earlier, most of VSRF defense was more or less competent), and that Russian losses were very large, up to 50%-60% of some units. Crucially, he said that local commanders are being shut out and information is not getting through to HQ, and that at any rate, everyone in Moscow is lying and profiteering while the army is being destroyed and the “special military operation” was being lost. It looked like Prigozhin was wildly exaggerating the situation on the front in order to paint the MOD leadership as incompetent and corrupt. He appeared to be positioning himself on the side of those inside (Surovikin, Alekseev, etc) who wanted to save the military from Shoigu and Gerasimov. Instead of opposing MOD, he was implying that he was trying to make it better to win the war. It was a smart move given his shaky ground after Shoigu made his power play.

On the 22nd, another challenge to MOD: a Wagner ad announced police-style jobs for former members of police, national guard, riot-control, and anyone with similar experience. They offered nearly $3,000/month for service in the war zone. Russian journalists from Vestka called the number and spoke to the recruiters. The job entailed enforcing Wagner code of conduct to ensure there’s no looting, beatings, and theft. Also, fighting Ukrainian saboteur groups. But also making sure Russian army soldiers abided by Wagner rules because Wagner had “full authority” and the Defense Ministry were “drinking like swine.” As if that were not enough, on the following day Prigozhin released a stunning video, in which we went well beyond his complaints about shortages and incompetence. He said that the Ukrainians had not “bombed Donbas for 8 years,” but attacked military targets only, that Donbas was plundered by the Russians, that Ukraine was not going to attack Russia with NATO soldiers, and that the Defense Ministry had lying to Putin and the Russian public, that the dash to Kyiv had aimed at regime change and that its failure had cost VSRF 10 times more lives than it should have. It was the clearest appeal to get MOD leadership removed to date, and in some respects challenged even Putin’s version of events. The Gordian knot appeared to have been tied. Now someone had to cut it.

The Mutiny of July 23 will have to await more information than I have available to be described fully and convincingly. I will offer my version of what happened that seems consistent with all known facts while bearing in mind that it must remain tentative at best. Prigozhin announced that MOD had attacked a Wagner base with missiles and that there were hundreds dead (MOD soon denied it), and called for rebellion (the translated declaration can be found here):

“PMC Wagner Commanders’ Council made a decision: the evil brought by the military leadership of the country must be stopped. They neglect the lives of soldiers. They forgot the word “justice”, and we will bring it back. Those, who destroyed today our guys, who destroyed tens, tens of thousands of lives of Russian soldiers will be punished. I’m asking: no one resist. Everyone who will try to resist, we will consider them a danger and destroy them immediately, including any checkpoints on our way. And any aviation that we see above our heads. I’m asking everyone to remain calm, do not succumb to provocations, and remain in their houses. Ideally, those along our way, do not go outside. After we finished what we started, we will return to the frontline to protect our motherland. Presidential authority, Government, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Rossgvardiya, and other departments will continue operating as before. We will deal with those who destroy Russian soldiers. And we will return to the frontline. Justice in the Army will be restored. And after this, justice for the whole of Russia.”

Wagner soldiers called their relatives to say goodbye, and marched on Rostov-on-the-Don (the HQ of Southern Military District) while another column under the command of Utkin dashed on Voronezh, which is on the way to Moscow. Each was estimated at around 4,000 men with heavy equipment, including MBTs and anti-aircraft defenses. Surovikin and Alekseev, both known to be on better terms with Prigozhin than Shoigu and Gerasimov, published strange “hostage” videos in which they called on Wagner to abort and obey MOD commands. FSB issued a call to Wagnerites not to obey Prigozhin. The “Moscow” column came under fire by helicopter, and shot down what later would prove to be several aircraft, including an IL-22 plane with a crew of 10. Otherwise, the progress of the Wagnerites was unimpeded.

The group under Prigozhin entered Rostov without encountering any resistance, and took over the HQ of South command while bemused (and often supportive) local residents looked on. Wagner released a video with Prigozhin’s encounter with General Ekurov and Alekseev (of earlier “hostage” video). In it, he told them that he’d come for Shoigu and Gerasimov (occasioning an oddly funny response by Alekseev, “Go get them!”), that until they were delivered, Wagner would block Rostov and go to Moscow, that they would destroy anyone who attempted to stop them, and that they had come to end the disgrace of the country (due to inept military leadership). He spoke quite disrespectfully to Ekurov but insisted that they would not interfere with operations in Ukraine. It appears that perhaps both Shoigu and Gerasimov had been at Rostov HQ earlier to deal with Prigozhin’s mutiny but had left prior to his arrival. Prigozhin released another video from the HQ, where he explained that Wagner had assumed control of the airport to ensure planes would not attack them but Ukrainians, that HQ was hard at work (so any problems at the front would not be due to Wagner), that “huge amount of territory” had been lost, and the number of soldiers killed is many times higher than reported (up to 1,000 casualties per day, including POWs, MIA, WIA, and refuseniks), and that the MOD leadership had run when they heard he was coming. For their part, MOD issued an address to Wagnerites saying that they had been deceived into a mutiny by their commanders.

On the 24th, Putin finally came out to make a statement. He declared the mutiny treason, and called for its suppression, saying he’s ordered resolution action against anyone who participates in it. With Putin siding with MOD, whatever hopes Prigozhin might have had to play the “king is good but his courtiers are bad” card were dashed instantly. From this point on, there was no plausible cover for what he was doing. His “March for Justice” as he had starting calling the mutiny was an open rebellion against the government. Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel — though not Prigozhin himself — reacted by saying that Putin had made “the wrong choice. So much worse for him. Soon we will have a new president.” This seemed highly unlikely unless parts of the military now joined Wagner, turning the mutiny into a rebellion.

What followed were the strangest several hours I can recall. Despite Putin’s threats and claims to have issued orders to suppress Wagner, nobody came out to do so. The “Moscow” column bypassed Voronezh and pressed on toward Moscow. There were reports of panicked elites flying out of Moscow, and many high-ranking officials went silent. The local authorities sometimes improvised — by destroying the roads with diggers or confiscating civilian trucks to block bridges — Wagner either bypassed the holes or pushed the vehicles aside. The crossings over Oka River were being prepared to resist, trenches were being dug in the outskirts of Moscow, and the mayor of Moscow declared Monday a holiday, urging everyone to stay indoors. The same TG channel published another statement, without attribution, “The trigger for the civil war was [Putin]. Instead of retiring a pair of degenerates, he decided to neutralize the most battle-worthy unit in Russia. Lives of two traitors placed higher than 25k heroes. It’s evident which side is evil here. Victory will be Wagner’s.”

However, instead of coming out to support the mutiny, various politicians and generals declared against Prigozhin. Kadyrov, several governors, and the speaker of the Duma were among the first. Prigozhin remained defiant, “We’re patriots of our Motherland. We fought and we are fighting, all fighters of PMC Wagner. And no one is going to surrender to the demands of the President, FSB, or anyone else. Because we don’t want the country to live further in corruption lies, and bureaucracy.” His message seemed to resonate at least with some residents of Rostov, which went out to give the Wagnerites water and food despite them now being insurrectionists. Others were mad, yelling at Wagner to leave the city because the military would otherwise destroy it. (I guess some Russian citizens are under no illusion what it is that their military does to cities.) The imperialist cult also split. While Girkin had Wagner pronounce a death sentence on him for calling on everyone to remain loyal to the Kremlin, Gubarev took a different road, “Putinist Russia will cease to exist in the coming days. We didn’t really love this state and it was always hostile to the Russians. Nobody will defend it. Those who are ready to defend it have no weapons or resources.” The Club of Angry Patriots issued a confusing statement where they claimed to have predicted everything but without saying who it was that they supported aside from the Motherland. The authorities seized a Wagner truck full of cash that Prigozhin later said was meant for payments to his employees (since all their transactions have always been in cash).

Kadyrov’s troops were ordered to Rostov, and they made their usual TikTok-heavy but distance-light progress, making sure they would arrive just in time after everything was done. The Moscow column entered Moscow oblast and was reportedly 2 hours away from the capital. The speed of their advance was astounding, and suggested a very well planned operation. The military blew up an oil depot in Voronezh in an attempt to deny the column supplies. The Russian Orthodox Church warned Prigozhin that “the sin of coup” cannot be forgiven. Rumors abounded that if all else fails, the bridges over Oka River would be destroyed. The Wanger TG channel said, “The state has not existed for a long time. Pypa [Putin] deliberately destroyed all state institutions. Corruption ended the rest. The end of this life holidays is near. Blown up bridges will not stop the inevitable. Justice will triumph.”

Prigozhin’s Mutiny, furthest extent (per Rybar Z-channel)

And then, just as abruptly as it had begun, the mutiny was over.

Lukashenko’s press desk said that after negotiations, Prigozhin had agreed to end the mutiny. After a few minutes, Prigozhin confirmed it, saying that “the moment has come when blood can be spilled. Understanding the responsibility that Russian blood could be spilled by one of the sides, we are turning our columns around and returning to the field camps, according to plan.” Wagner-affiliated TG channel declared that it was tearing up its Wagner contract and that everyone would be avenged. The contours of the deal began to emerge: the criminal case that FSB had opened against Prigozhin ealier would be dropped, with the man himself going to Belarus. Wagner troops would return to the field camps and would not be prosecuted. No changes would be made at MOD. Girkin cried foul because the mutineers seemed to be getting off without even a slap of the wrist despite taking a city hostage, killing at least a dozen Russian soldiers, destroying military eqiopment, and even threatening Moscow. But it did not matter — Prigozhin left Rostov for an unknown destination — before Akhmat reached him — but not before receiving the adulations of the crowd that came to see him off. The Wagner column, which the propagandists claimed had run out of fuel, turned around and rove hundreds of miles back to their bases. Putin issued another statement, much more conciliatory than the first, saying everyone except for the commander [Prigozhin, who remained unnamed] were blameless, and heroes, and that the unity of Russian society had helped avoid bloodshed. I guess the fact that nobody came out to defend the regime is a kind of unity that did avoid bloodshed.

But the episode has everyone scratching their heads in bewildernment. What did we just witness?

Let me start by saying that I do not know what happened. And neither does anyone else, despite their claims. The best we can do is attempt to construct a narrative that is consistent with the known facts and that can make some logical sense. Any such narrative would have account for the following observations and deal with the following questions:

1. The mutiny was well-organized, and probably required weeks of planning. It was soon revealed that US intel knew about the preparations, and it is almost certain that FSB had detected them as well. Were FSB just too slow? Were they too dismissive of the seriousness of the threat? Why did they take no known precautions? Or did they try to take them but something went wrong? Did they alert the military, and if so why was the military not ready to stop the Wagnerites?
2. How did Prigozhin get to Rostov, where he could harangue a general, so quickly, and why did he go there?
3. How was Utkin able to advance so quickly to Moscow without meeting any but scattered resistance by civilian authorities and what appear to be attempts by some local commander to delay him? What was their goal after reaching Moscow? Why were the divisions usually taked with defending the city — Kantemirovskaya and Tamanskaya — not told to move out to meet the Wagnerites?
4. Contrary to Prigozhin’s claims, Shoigu’s July 1 deadline would not have been the end of Wagner (aside maybe from his involvement with it) because tens of thousands of Wagnerites in Africa cannot suddenly become MOD employees — it’s one thing to have a nominally private organization, it’s quite another to have the official Russian military doing whatever it is that the Wagnerites are doing in Africa.
5. What would Prigozhin and whoever else from Wagner — reportedly up to 8,000 troops — who go with him do in Belarus? What is Lukashenko’s role in all of this?
6. Why did the mutiny end so abruptly? If Prigozhin was given some assurances, how credible are they? He would never be in a position as strong as he had on July 24, why would he abandon that for incredible promises of safety?
7. Wagner was never a private army — it always received some form of state-funding, and was dependent on supplies from MOD in Ukraine. State TV channels in Russia reported that it had gotten over $10 billion over 7 years in addition to another $10 billion to Prigozhin’s company Concord. These are vast sums, even if exaggerated for dramatic effect (recall that until recently, the Kremlin denied any involvement with Wagner).

As of today, the story the Kremlin cobbled together and that is actively peddled by propagandists runs as follows. The whole thing was a private grievance by Prigozhin who felt he wanted more money than the already generous sums he had been receiving from the state. (The quoted $20 billion is about twice the annual budget of the city of St. Petersburg.) He was stopped by the combined efforts of the military and civilians, and many Wagnerites refused to follow his orders, both in Rostov and in Luhansk. He was going to lose, but Putin wanted to avoid bloodshed, so he offered him a way out. Wagner sucks anyway because it took them nearly 8 months to capture tiny Bakhmut while the mighty VSRF took the much larger Mariupol in 40 days. There was never any danger to Putin or the government, there are no grievances in the army, or any split among the elites or between the elites and the population.

Meanwhile, Prigozhin has disbanded his media holding — although it looks like his famous troll factory is likely to continue under new ownership. He is likely liquidating assets like the “Wagner HQ” in St Petersburg (the interesting thing here is that it appears this was never really affiliated with Wagner — it was a business center that Prigozhin had tried to get approved but he ran afoul of the governor, with whom he has had an ongoing feud — when the latter refused to approve the building for intended use, Prigozhin had it renamed Wagner HQ — with a huge name on the facade — which made it so much harder to resist). The authorities in Belarus are reportedly constructing facilities to receive Wagnerites, but how many would come is not known. So far, there have been no confirmed reports of anyone going there. Many Wagnerites have signed up with MOD, and there have been a few instances of (unconfirmed) vendettas against Wagner soldiers by VSRF troops.

Putin canceled his long-standing COVID protocol that required visitors to spend two weeks in quarantine before meeting him, and went to Derbent (Dagestan), where he was filmed freely mixing with adoring crowds, kissing children, and so on, in an obvious attempt to project the image of a leader beloved by the people. Meanwhile, there is ongoing speculation that General Surovikin has been detained in connection with the mutiny. His family denies it but he has not made any media appearances since the “hostage” video.

If I were to attempt an explanation, it would go as follows. Shoigu’s clan had increased its share of the pie dramatically during the war, eating into the shares of competitor “towers” of the Kremlin. The growing imbalance began to worry the others, including FSB. Meanwhile, the inept prosecution of the war in Ukraine created natural opponents to Shoigu and Gerasimov within MOD and across the elites. Under usual circumstances, it would be Putin who mediated this sort of conflict and ensured that nobody got too greedy or felt too threatened. However, access to Putin was limited and given the distorted info likely fed to him, he might not have realized just how dangerous the situation had become.

For his part, Prigozhin — who had never been part of the system — arrived as an outsider when he was asked last year to come and help with the war in Ukraine. Wagner did better than the battered VSRF, perhaps unexpectedly so. They were rewarded with more support and resources to continue fighting in Ukraine. But as his successes there grew, so did Prigozhin’s apetite and imagination. He began to criticize MOD for incompetence, guardedly at first, but when there was no clampdown, he became bolder. At one point, Putin reportedly had to intervene to get him and Shoigu to cooperate again, and that was successful. After the Ukrainian fall counter-offensive liberated Kharkiv and Kherson, the MOD leadership became thoroughly discredit in the eyes of many Russians who followed the war. Prigozhin escalated his attacks, perhaps sensing that he had support within MOD for a change of leadership and some more prominent role for himself. This time, Putin stayed out of the feud, which must have fed Prigozhin’s ambitions. He was on decent terms with several important generals, Surovikin being the most well-known, but not the only one. Prigozhin might have decided to use the conquest of Bakhmut to demonstrate the value of Wagner as the only force capable of taking territory in Ukraine. His demand for resources was incessant, and MOD repeatedly tried to satisfy some of it while balancing its other priorities on the front. If they did not want to give him everything, it was not entirely because they did not wish him to succeed (after all, a gain is a gain) but because the wider picture required resources for the Gerasimov Offensive — which sputtered — and for defense against the inevitable ZSU counter-offensive. Prigozhin, of course, blamed his extremely slow and costly progress on sabotage by MOD, and became increasingly hysterical over perceived slights. MOD might have tried to reign him in by denying him access to higher levels of command, and by limiting his supplies to show him just how dependent he was on them. But since Putin said nothing, Prigozhin — who had reportedly been unable to through to Putin for months — interpreted it as a green light to continue his attacks on MOD.

Why would Prigozhin think that Putin would support him? Putin is known to be very loyal to those loyal to him, and there’s hardly anyone more loyal than Shoigu. Putin isalso known to be extremely reluctant to replace people, and certainly replacing someone like Shoigu — who has a vast network of dependents — would not be easy even if Putin wanted it. It is not even clear that Putin would know that Shoigu might need replacing to begin with. It’s possible, of course, that Prigozhin seriously overestimated his importance and failed to understand insider Kremlin dynamics — after all he is not, and never has been, an insider. He might have been misled into believing certain things by his contacts at the Kremlin who had their own reasons to want Shoigu’s power curbed. Or it could be that he understood that Putin would not move against Shoigu unless he had no choice — confronted with a massive obvious failure of MOD leadership, widespread demand for change, and public pressure by someone as popular as Wagner — maybe he would have just enough political cover to make some changes, like appointing Shoigu to another post and promoting someone more competent in his place, someone perhaps who would give Prigozhin the resources he wanted to continue to fight in Ukraine or pursue another career, perhaps as a political figure. For those in the Kremlin wishing to redistribute power and wealth away from Shoigu’s clan, the Wagner-MOD conflict was God-sent as it provided them with a plausible cover — concern with winning the war for Mother Russia — to increase their own share of the pie. This could explain what might have been a less than prompt FSB investigation and the belated warning given to MOD leadership about the mutiny. It could be that Prigozhin’s preparations were known to someone at MOD as well, if not actively assisted (this is less likely).

As the feud, possibly fed by interested parties at the Kremlin, escalated, Shoigu sent repeated warnings to Prigozhin to cease and desist. When the indirect methods through manipulating supplies did not work, he had the Chechens openly threaten Wagner. When this failed as well, Shoigu took the drastic step of requiring Wagner — at least the units in Russia and Ukraine — to subordinate themselves formally to MOD. This meant eliminating Prigozhin as a player, and at this point the cook had very little choice. He had to either go va banque hoping that Putin would support him or submit. Wagner had been withdrawn from the front, had rested, and had been resupplied, and contingency plans must have been made either at this point or even earlier.

What would that plan be? If Wagner could capture Shoigu and Gerasimov, it could be sold as the action of people baited by the inept bureaucracy beyond endurance, who then throw themselves on the mercy of the Tsar, and Putin would get the captives released but — owing to the widespread approval for the actions of the Wagnerites — have them replaced. It could be that FSB had informed Shoigu about these plans, which would explain the preemptive strike on the Wagner base, which could have been an attempt to assassinate Prigozhin himself. At this point, the die was cast, and Wagner activated the plan. Prigozhin raced to Rostov in an attempt to catch the MOD leaders (which failed), while Utkin raced to Moscow in an attempt to apply pressure there. While it will never be quite clear just what the intent was, and indeed, whether entering Moscow would have been possible, one plan would run as follows. Given the speed of the advance, there would be widespread confusion, and a lot of uncertain loyalties with great hesitancy to declare for either side before it became clear who had the upper hand. The mutineers had already seen this in action when 180 soldiers of VSRF meekly allowed themselves to be disarmed — and photographed! — rather than resist the Wagnerites. It would take just a few hours of delaying orders, of dragging of feet, to enable them to pass obstacles unimpeded. The fact that the divisions guarding Moscow were put on alert but appear never to have received orders to move out illustrates that. As the Wagner column approached Moscow, the failure to resist them would have created a serious momentum that would have likely caused police and Rossgvardiya units — who are not equipped to deal with a real military threat anyway — to wobble, with many prudently making themselves scarce like their colleagues in Rostov had done. There is evidence that Moscow elites had panicked, some fled the city, others began to make arrangements to leave. It is not even clear whether Putin had remained behind after his plane took off. (Peskov claimed that he had but now there are claims that he had gone to St Petersburg to watch the Scarlet Sails show!) Once in the capital, Wagner would have likely captured the Ministry of Defense and perhaps other administrative buildings, with the expectations that sympathetic elements in MOD would declare for replacing MOD leadership. I believe this was the extent of the plan, and that Prigozhin never contemplated removing Putin irrespective of the rash claims made by the Wagner-affiliated TG channel.

Putin’s open declaration of support for MOD against Wagner must have thrown Prigozhin in for a loop. Everything in this plan hinged on Putin remaining aloof until presented with the fact that Shoigu had failed to prevent or contain the mutiny (and was hopefully in Wagner’s hands). I would think that the negotiations between Prigozhin and the Kremlin must have started very soon after that. While publicly everything was going according to plan for Prigozhin, privately, he was looking for a way out. It might be that Putin’s initial angry reaction was driven by fear and the belief that this mutiny was against him — if Prigozhin reached out soon after that to relieve him, it would also explain the more relaxed tone he took afterwards. If negotiations were already happening, then no orders to stop the “Moscow” column by force would have gone out, just preparations to do so should the negotiations fail. The Wagner rank-and-file who had followed Prigozhin might have genuinely believed that they were fighting for justice, and would have been unaware of these schemes. And neither would more entrepreneurial local VSRF commanders who decided to resist without waiting for orders to do so, which would explain the attacks on the column.

How would the deal work? Prigozhin probably realized that with Putin declaring against him, the road ahead would mean either the obliteration of Wagner column on the approach to Moscow (certainly, the Russian Air Force could do that despite all civilians on the road with the Wagnerites) or capturing buildings in the capital, which would either mean delayed obliteration if nobody joins him and the regime organizes a response, or civil war if the military splinters and some units join Wagner. These are terrible options, especially because it’s very unlikely that Prigozhin thought he would be able to rule in Putin’s stead. So it is probably not difficult to understand Prigozhin’s incentives to strike a deal here. Anything, basically, that allows him to escape with his life and maybe even with part of his fortune. Being in Belarus would provide him with some safe haven in the sense that if he remained — openly — in Russia, then the Kremlin would have to at least make the appearance of going after him for the mutiny. I would think this is where Lukashenko had to come in in order to agree to this. I do not know what he was offered in exchange, perhaps some use of Wagner veterans as trainers for his army?

But if Prigozhin was so eager to get a deal, why would Putin offer him anything but unconditional surrender? The bargain that allowed Prigozhin to escape and the mutineers to avoid punishment for insurrection and the killing of Russian soldiers does not look good for Putin. This is why the Kremlin is working so hard to spin it for domestic audiences with all the tales about avoiding bloodshed. As we have seen, the imperialists are not buying it — Girkin predicts that this is the beginning of the end for Putin’s rule and that the next major disaster in Ukraine might unleash a mutiny that would not be so easily stopped. The West is not buying it either — with most experts saying that the mutiny revealed a huge weakness in Putin’s regime, and CIA Director Burns even saying that the lack of support for Putin it exposed among the population presented the Agency with great opportunities (for recruitment) that it was sure to use. The incident also revealed that when Putin is backed into a corner, he would negotiate rather than fight desperately as a cornered rat — which is what tankies often like to claim when they argue for offering concessions to Russia. It is not clear to me whether the Kremlin narrative would stick in Russia. The state-controlled media promptly produced some fairy-tales about 80% approval of how Putin handled it, but we all know what this means. The reality is that while regular people came out in the streets in the thousands and tried to stop the tanks with their bodies during the coup attempt in 1991, the people of Rostov went to take selfies with the Wagnerites and themselves restrained fellow residents who tried to confront Prigozhin’s men. There seems to have been little love lost for Putin among the population. The fact that almost nobody in the military took the initiative to come out against Wagner on their march into Rostov (a city of over a million) or to Moscow also seems to indicate that dissatisfaction with Shoigu runs deep in VSRF as well. In other words, it does not appear that Putin’s offer was very advantageous to Putin, at least in that respect. Why did he not take sterner measures against Wagner?

One factor could be the reaction of other Wagnerites if the regime just slaughtered several thousand of them without even attempting to negotiate. Even if misguided in the way they did it, those who participated in the “March for Justice” espoused goals that are likely popular. Killing them en masse could enrage other Wagnerites, but maybe even soldiers who had fought with them, and who do blame Shoigu. As Euromaidan showed in 2014 in Ukraine, extremely harsh repressive measures could very well galvanize support for the protesters, and backfire spectacularly. Given the ease with which the mutiny had unfolded, Putin might also have been worried about the reliability of his intelligence and security services, let alone the army. If a bloody repression caused a public backlash, there could be more serious trouble ahead. Settling this without bloodshed, therefore, was not the move of a wise statesman portrayed in the media, it was the move of a ruler who realizes that he has been dealt a weak hand and that repression might prove very dangerous to him. The calculation here would be whether the risks of disappointing the imperialists were greater than the risks of disappointing an unknown, but potentially, significant part of the population, the military, and who-knows who else. So the explanation could be that Putin considered the imperialists a far less potent threat than the large unknown. Hence, making Prigozhin an offer that is far more generous than what he had been entitled to receive given his weak strategic position.

But if Putin’s offer was made under duress in light of these unpleasant expectations, then why would Prigozhin believe any promises of safety? After all, once the immediate danger has passed, what’s to prevent Putin from reneging on any and all promises made? Indeed, initially there were some signs of precisely thins starting to occur. In a very clownish sequence of events, Peskov announced that FSB had dropped the mutiny charges and closed the investigation into Prigozhin, then FSB sources contradicted this, saying that it was very much still open — which prompted a lot of cheering among the Girkin crowd — then FSB officially said that the case was actually closed. Obviously, not everyone got the memo about the deal soon enough. It is also to be expected that there will be internal investigations to see how far sympathies for the mutiny — let alone actual support — had spread. I would bet that Surovikin is being questions although I doubt that he would be publicly punished no matter what the investigations uncover. After all, the Kremlin’s story is that there was no support for the mutiny, and appearances would have to be kept. Any punishment would be out of sight, and probably delayed. All of this indicates that there should be at least some doubts about the credibility of any promises made to Prigozhin. Why would he believe them?

Maybe he simply did not have a choice — it’s either this, a slim chance of survival — or the worse alternative. But there are other possibilities. The fact that Prigozhin has been allowed access to his assets and, apparently, the ability to travel back to Russia suggests that other possibilities are more likely. The most obvious one is that killing Prigozhin soon after the negotiating a deal with him would undermine the rationale for making the deal in the first place. With Prigozhin gone, Wagnerites would rightly wonder whether they are next on the chopping block, and who knows what they would do then. They are still experienced veterans, and it would be a waste to provoke them into some anti-Putin action. It also could be that Prigozhin has enough dirt on people in the Kremlin to write 20 best-sellers, and so the threat to reveal the secrets in case of untimely demise might be adding to the incentive to let him be.

So there you are, this is my “Tom Clancy” take on the mutiny. It’s not as exciting as many others, but I think it accounts for the known facts rather well. If this interpretation is correct, there are some important implications. The first, and perhaps most critical, is that the negotiated deal with Prigozhin does not resolve the underling problem with Shoigu at the helm of MOD. Putin must have a whole lot of questions about how the situations had been allowed to deteriorate to this point, with special attention to what the FSB did or did not do, and who else might have been involved. The affair is unlikely to lead to purges because there never was a threat to the regime or Putin — it was more of an internal mafia-style conflict that the boss failed to mediate on time, and now has to settle to the satisfaction of all involve while maintaining public appearances of unity. Perhaps Putin would move to equilibrate the distribution of power among the “towers” and curb Shoigu’s influence in the interests of stability, perhaps even find something “better” for Shoigu to do in order to mollify the disgruntled at the military. But Putin prizes loyalty very highly, and I do not know what obvious candidates are that could replace Shoigu on that dimension. There must be some changes, however, and they will be intended to regularize the tower competition and reestablish Putin in his role as indispensable moderator. Everyone whose wealth depends on the Kremlin — which is to say most of the actors involved — is interested in this rather than the downfall of the regime and any smuta that might follow.

The problem for Putin here is that the mutiny did reveal weakness of his rule, even if not to the extent that Western hopefuls are predicting. And so elite desire for ensuring that the regime endures is tempered by their expectations of what Putin’s rule is going to produce — if the situation in Ukraine continues to deteriorate, with the West showing no signs of weakening its support, then the incentive to alter course would increase, and the fissures whose existence was revealed by the mutiny would be the obvious ones to exploit. It seems to me that Putin now must act quickly at home to attempt to repair these fissures — not easy to do at all — while simultaneously avoiding bad losses in Ukraine, which might also prove very difficult in the coming months. This leads me to the last section of this update, which indicates that Russia is in for some serious troubles.

Political and Economic Developments

The problem for Putin is that the invasion of Ukraine has reached a dead end for his regime. There is no way forward to more conquests, and it is looking increasingly unlikely that the Kremlin would be able to hold onto its existing ones either. Given the fundamental weaknesses in the economy, a mass mobilization to win the war of the type that Girkin & Co. are dreaming of is exceedingly unlikely as well. Meanwhile, the war is taking its toll on Russians. According to a survey conducted since November last year, the share of the population who have acquaintances or relatives who had been mobilized for the war and died as a result has increased from 5.6% to 20.2%. (An analogous question for Ukraine showed that 78% had friends or relatives who had been wounded or killed since the invasion began.) The war is becoming more personal with no path to victory for Russia.

Do you have acquaintances or relatives who were mobilized and died? November 2022 through May 2023.

The belief in victory strongly conditions support for military operations. For example, primed by incessant harping about “the second military in the world”, Americans were initially skeptical about Ukraine’s chances to win (victory being vaguely defined here). Support last year increased after the successful counter-offensive but dipped in the spring after the appearance of a stalemate and the loss of Bakhmut — the steady stream of defeatist and astonishingly bad analyses in the media did not help here at all. But Americans have sensed a victor and they have decided to back Ukraine. The most recent polls show a sharp rise in backing for arming Ukraine, with 65% of the respondents (with majorities among both parties and Independents) approving of the shipments compared with 46% in a May poll. While public support is not necessary to continue military aid, it sure helps, and it might provide the context for the eventual approval of cluster munitions, ATACMS, and F-16s.

The economic situation in Russia cannot raise Kremlin’s hopes for prevailing in a protracted war. According to data published by The Moscow Times, the government has drastically cut its spending after a fall in revenue from exports of raw materials:

• as of May 27, the government has spent 48% of its annual budget but collected only 40% of projected revenue — the deficit now is at 134% of plan
• payments were halved to 44bn rubles per day from 88bn average over the previous five months
• the tax revenue has fallen by 19% compared to the same period last year
• income from oil and gas sales has halved as well, to 2.85 tn rubles from 5.66 tn, and the terms offered to China and India involve double-digit discounts
• spending overall has increased by 26%, and a third (3.9 tn rubles) are secret (this represents a tenfold increase in secret spending) — it’s estimated that about 3.1 tn of that is war-related (only 884bn is spent through open budget)
• the trade imbalance with China is reaching stunning proportions: imports from China have increased by 76% this year while exports to China have grown only by 20% and Russia already imported a whole lot more than it exported
• since Russia imports manufactured products shipped in containers but exports raw materials shipped in tanks or open carriages, there are thousands upon thousands of empty containers clogging the railway stations in Moscow oblast and Central Russia; logistical operators are offering discounts for taking the empty containers out of Russia

The ruble continues its slide, and a recent slight recovery was likely due to intervention by the Central Bank attempting to arrest its fall. Meanwhile, the government announced a 10.5% increase in the salaries of siloviki and the military starting October 1st. The Kremlin will not run out of money, but its war finance is becoming increasingly strained, just when the war is beginning to affect the wider population. It is likely tohat disconent with the regime will increase and since the prospect of victories in Ukraine is fairly dim, there would be little to throw at that to deflect it. The public might require bread and circuses, and neither might be available.

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